Choose Configured Peers or Direct A2A Endpoints
Outbound A2A calls can target a named peer from a2a_agents configuration or an approved direct endpoint. Named peers are appropriate for recurring relationships; direct URLs are useful for controlled discovery and one-off tests.
Official documentation: https://hermes-agent.nousresearch.com/docs/user-guide/messaging/a2a
Prefer a named peer for repeat work
A configured peer can carry a stable URL, authentication method, timeout, and declared capabilities. The official example uses a name such as researcher, a URL, bearer authentication, a bounded timeout, and capability labels. The name becomes a durable operator-facing handle instead of forcing every prompt to repeat network details.
Use a direct endpoint when evaluating a new peer, diagnosing discovery, or making a single approved call. Discover its Agent Card first. Treat the card as peer-supplied metadata—not as proof of trust, competence, or authorization.
The A2A documentation does not define how configured capability labels should override or merge with discovered card data. Avoid inventing precedence; review both sources and keep the operational policy explicit.
Peer review checklist
- Confirm who owns the endpoint.
- Fetch and inspect the canonical Agent Card.
- Review the routable URL and authentication requirement.
- Set a timeout appropriate to the task.
- Keep tokens in the approved secret store.
- Start with synthetic, non-sensitive input.
- Promote a direct endpoint to named configuration only after verification.
Common pitfalls
- Calling an unreviewed URL from prompt text. Peer input and endpoints are untrusted until validated.
- Copying bearer tokens into configuration examples or chat. Use placeholders and local secret handling.
- Treating capabilities as authorization. A skill label only advertises what a peer says it can do.
- Leaving experimental peers in durable config. Remove or disable relationships that did not pass review.
Verification
Run a2a_discover against the trusted test endpoint, record the non-secret card fields, and make a harmless call. Compare the response, latency, and audit entry with the named-peer configuration. Confirm that invalid authentication fails and that removing the peer prevents later calls by its configured name.
